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The Wiretap Channel with Feedback:
Encryption over the Channel
Lifeng Lai, Hesham El Gamal and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract
In this work, the critical role of noisy feedback in enhancing the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel is established. Unlike previous works, where a noiseless public discussion channel is used for
feedback, the feed-forward and feedback signals share the same noisy channel in the present model.
Quite interestingly, this noisy feedback model is shown to be more advantageous in the current setting.
More specifically, the discrete memoryless modulo-additive channel with a full-duplex destination node
is considered first, and it is shown that the judicious use of feedback increases the perfect secrecy
capacity to the capacity of the source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper. In the
achievability scheme, the feedback signal corresponds to a private key, known only to the destination.
In the half-duplex scheme, a novel feedback technique that always achieves a positive perfect secrecy
rate (even when the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel) is
proposed. These results hinge on the modulo-additive property of the channel, which is exploited by the
destination to perform encryption over the channel without revealing its key to the source. Finally, this
scheme is extended to the continuous real valued modulo-Λ channel where it is shown that the perfect
secrecy capacity with feedback is also equal to the capacity in the absence of the wiretapper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of secure communication from an information theoretic perspective was pioneered
by Shannon [1]. In Shannon’s model, both the sender and the destination possess a common secret
key K, which is unknown to the wiretapper, and use this key to encrypt and decrypt the message
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2M . Shannon considered a scenario where both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have
direct access to the transmitted signal and introduced the perfect secrecy condition I(M ;Z) = 0,
implying that the signal Z received by the wiretapper does not provide any additional information
about the source message M . Under this model, he proved the pessimistic result that the
achievability of perfect secrecy requires the entropy of the shared private key K to be at least
equal to the entropy of the message itself (i.e., H(K) ≥ H(M) for perfect secrecy). Clearly,
the distribution of the secret key under this model is challenging.
In a pioneering work [2], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel and established the possibility
of creating an almost perfectly secure source-destination link without relying on private (secret)
keys. In the wiretap channel, both the wiretapper and destination observe the source encoded
message through noisy channels. Similar to Shannon’s model, the wiretapper is assumed to have
unlimited computational resources. Wyner showed that when the source-wiretapper channel is
a degraded version of the source-destination channel, the source can send perfectly secure1
messages to the destination at a non-zero rate. The main idea is to hide the information stream
in the additional noise impairing the wiretapper by using a stochastic encoder which maps
each message to many codewords according to an appropriate probability distribution. This
way, one induces maximal equivocation at the wiretapper. By ensuring that the equivocation
rate is arbitrarily close to the message rate, one achieves perfect secrecy in the sense that the
wiretapper is now limited to learn almost nothing about the source-destination messages from its
observations. Follow-up work by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman has characterized the secrecy
capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channel [4]. In a landmark paper,
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized Wyner’s approach by considering the transmission of confidential
messages over broadcast channels [5]. This work characterized the perfect secrecy capacity of
Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMC)s, and showed that the perfect secrecy capacity is positive
unless the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel (referred
to as the main channel in the sequel)2.
Positive secrecy capacity is not always possible to achieve in practice. In an attempt to transmit
1Wyner’s notion of per symbol equivocation is weaker than Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [3].
2The source-wiretapper channel is said to be less noisy than the main channel, if for every V → X → Y Z, I(V ;Z) ≥
I(V ;Y ), where X is the signal transmitted by the source, and where Y and Z are the received signal at the receiver and the
wiretapper respectively.
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3messages securely in these unfavorable scenarios, [6] and [7] considered the wiretap channel
with noiseless feedback3. They showed that one may leverage the feedback to achieve a positive
perfect secrecy rate, even when the feed-forward perfect secrecy capacity is zero. In this model,
there exists a separate noiseless public channel, through which the transmitter and receiver
can exchange information. The wiretapper is assumed to obtain a perfect copy of the messages
transmitted over this public channel. Upper and lower bounds were derived for the perfect secrecy
capacity with noiseless feedback in [6], [7]. In several cases, as discussed in detail in the sequel,
these bounds coincide. But, in general, the perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback
remains unknown. Along the same line, [8] established the critical role of a trusted/untrusted
helper in enhancing the secret key capacity of public discussion algorithms. The multi-terminal
generalization of the basic set-up of [6], [7] was studied in [9]. Finally, in [10]–[12], the public
discussion paradigm was extended to handle the existence of active adversaries.
Our work represents a marked departure from the public discussion paradigm. In our model,
we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. Instead, the feedback
signal from the destination, which is allowed to depend on the signal received so far, is transmitted
over the same noisy channel used by the source. Based on the noisy feedback signal, the source
can then causally adapt its transmission scheme, hoping to increase the perfect secrecy rate. The
wiretapper receives a mixture of the signal from the source and the feedback signal from the
destination. Quite interestingly, we show that in the modulo-additive DMC with a full-duplex
destination, the perfect secrecy capacity with noisy feedback equals the capacity of the main
channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the capacity is achieved with a simple
scheme where the source ignores the feedback signal and the destination feeds back randomly
generated symbols from a certain alphabet set. This feedback signal plays the role of a private
key, known only by the destination, and encryption is performed by the modulo-additive channel.
The more challenging scenario with a half-duplex destination, which cannot transmit and receive
simultaneously, is considered next. Here, the active transmission periods by the destination will
introduce erasures in the feed-forward source-destination channel. In this setting, we propose a
novel feedback scheme that achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate for any non-trivial channel
distribution. The feedback signal in our approach acts as a private destination only key which
3The authors also considered a more general secret sharing problem.
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wiretapper. Finally, the proposed scheme is extended to the continuous modulo-Λ lattice channel
where it is shown to achieve the capacity of the main channel. Overall, our work proposes a
novel approach for encryption where 1) the feedback signal is used as a private key known only
to the destination and 2) the encryption is performed by exploiting the modulo-additive property
of the channel. This encryption approach is shown to be significantly superior to the classical
public discussion paradigm.
Recently, there has been a resurgent interest in studying secure communications from in-
formation theoretic perspective under various scenarios. The point-to-point fading eavesdropper
channel was considered in [13]–[18] under different assumptions on the delay constraints and
the available transmitter Channel State Information (CSI). In [19]–[22], the information theoretic
limits of secure communications over multiple access channels were explored. The relay channel
with confidential messages, where the relay acts both as a wiretapper and a helper, was studied
in [23], [24]. In [25], the interference channel with confidential messages was studied. In [26],
the four terminal relay-eavesdropper channel was introduced and analyzed. The wiretap channel
with side information was studied in [27].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model and
our notation. Section III describes and analyzes the proposed feedback scheme which achieves
the capacity of the full duplex modulo-additive DMC. Taking the Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC) as an example, we then compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the public
discussion approach. The half-duplex scenario is studied in Section IV. In Section V, we extend
our results to the modulo-Λ lattice channel. Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks
and outlines possible venues for future research.
II. THE MODULO-ADDITIVE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL
Throughout the sequel, the upper-case letter X will denote a random variable, a lower-case
letter x will denote a realization of the random variable, a calligraphic letter X will denote a finite
alphabet set and a boldface letter x will denote a vector. Furthermore, we let [x]+ = max{0, x}.
Without feedback, our modulo-additive discrete memoryless wiretap channel is described by the
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5following relations at time i
y(i) = x(i) + n1(i),
z(i) = x(i) + n2(i), (1)
where y(i) is the received symbol at the destination, z(i) is the received symbol at the wiretapper,
x(i) is the channel input, n1(i) and n2(i) are the noise samples at the destination and wiretapper,
respectively. Here N1 and N2 are allowed to be correlated, while each process is assumed
to be individually drawn from an identically and independently distributed source. Also we
have X ∈ X = {0, 1, · · · , |X | − 1}, Y, N1 ∈ Y = {0, 1, · · · , |Y| − 1} and Z,N2 ∈ Z =
{0, 1, · · · , |Z| − 1} with finite alphabet sizes |X |, |Y|, |Z| respectively. Here ‘+’ is understood
to be modulo addition with respect to the corresponding alphabet size, i.e., y(i) = [x(i)+n1(i)]
mod |Y| and z(i) = [x(i) + n2(i)] mod |Z| with addition in the real field.
In this paper, we focus on the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, at time
i the destination sends the causal feedback signal X1(i) over the same noisy channel used for
feed-forward transmission, i.e., we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback
channel. The causal feedback signal is allowed to depend on the received signal so far Y i−1, i.e.,
X1(i) = Ψ(Y
i−1), where Ψ can be any (possibly stochastic) function. In general, we allow the
destination to choose the alphabet of the feedback signal X1 and the corresponding size |X1|.
With this noisy feedback from the destination, the received signal at the source, wiretapper and
destination are
y0(i) = x(i) + x1(i) + n0(i),
y(i) = x(i) + x1(i) + n1(i),
and
z(i) = x(i) + x1(i) + n2(i),
respectively. Here Y0 ∈ Y0 = {0, 1, · · · , |Y0| − 1} is the received noisy feedback signal at the
source and N0 is the feedback noise, which may be correlated with N1 and N2. We denote the
alphabet size of N0 and Y0 by |Y0|. Again, all ‘+’ operation should be understood to be modulo
addition with corresponding alphabet size.
Now, the source wishes to send the message W ∈ W = {1, · · · ,M} to the destination using a
(M,n) code consisting of: 1) a casual stochastic encoder f at the source that maps the message
DRAFT
6w and the received noisy feedback signal yi−10 to a codeword x ∈ X n with
x(i) = f(i, w, yi−10 ), (2)
2) a stochastic feedback encoder Ψ at the destination that maps the received signal into X1(i)
with x1(i) = Ψ(yi−1) and 3) a decoding function at the destination d: Yn → W . The average
error probability of the (M,n) code is
P ne =
∑
w∈W
1
M
Pr{d(y) 6= w|w was sent}. (3)
The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as
Re =
1
n
H(W |Z). (4)
We are interested in perfectly secure transmission rates defined as follows.
Definition 1: A secrecy rate Rf is said to be achievable over the wiretap channel with noisy
feedback if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (M,n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ),
we have
Rf =
1
n
log2M, (5)
P ne ≤ ǫ, (6)
1
n
H(W |Z) ≥ Rf − ǫ. (7)
Definition 2: The secrecy capacity with noisy feedback Cfs is the maximum rate at which
messages can be sent to the destination with perfect secrecy; i.e.
Cfs = sup
f,Ψ
{Rf : Rf is achievable}. (8)
Note that in our model, the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computation resources and
to know the coding scheme of the source and the feedback function Ψ used by the destination.
We believe that our feedback model captures realistic scenarios where the terminals exchange
information over noisy channels.
III. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FULL-DUPLEX FEEDBACK
A. Known Results
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap DMC without feedback Cs was characterized in [5].
Specializing to our modulo-additive channel, one obtains
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
[I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z)]+. (9)
DRAFT
7The wiretap DMC with public discussion was introduced and analyzed in [6], [7]. More
specifically, these papers considered a more general model in which all the nodes observe
correlated variables4, and there exists an extra noiseless public channel with infinite capacity,
through which both the source and the destination can send information. Combining the correlated
variables and the publicly discussed messages, the source and the destination generate a key about
which the wiretap only has negligible information. Please refer to [7] for rigorous definitions
of these notions. Since the public discussion channel is noiseless, the wiretapper is assumed to
observe a noiseless version of the information transmitted over it. It is worth noting that some
of the schemes proposed in [6], [7] manage only to generate an identical secret key at both the
source and destination. The source may then need to encrypt its message using the one-time
pad scheme which reduces the effective source-destination information rate. Thus, the effective
secrecy rate that could be used to transmit information from the source to the destination may
be less than the results reported in [6], [7]. Nevertheless, we use these results for comparison
purposes (which is generous to the public discussion paradigm). The following theorem gives
upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity of the public discussion paradigm Cps .
Theorem 3 ( [6], [7]): The secret key capacity of the public discussion approach satisfies the
following conditions:
max{max
PX
[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)],max
PX
[I(X ; Y )− I(Y ;Z)]} ≤ Cps ≤ min{max
PX
I(X ; Y ),max
PX
I(X ; Y |Z)}.
Proof: Please refer to [6], [7].
These bounds are known to be tight in the following cases [6], [7].
1) PY Z|X = PY |XPZ|X , i.e., the main channel and the source-wiretapper channel are inde-
pendent; in this case
Cps = max
PX
{I(X ; Y )− I(Y ;Z)}. (10)
2) PXZ|Y = PX|Y PZ|Y , i.e., X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain, and hence the source-
wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel. In this case
Cps = max
PX
{I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)}. (11)
4 The wiretap channel model is a particular mechanism for the nodes to observe the correlated variables, and corresponds to
the “channel type model” studied in [7].
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public discussion does not increase the secrecy capacity for the degraded wiretap channel.
3) PXY |Z = PX|ZPY |Z , i.e., X → Z → Y , so that the main channel is a degraded version of
the wiretap channel. In this case
Cps = 0. (12)
Again, public discussion does not help in this scenario.
B. The Main Result
Before presenting the main theorem, we present the crypto lemma which will be intensively
used later.
Lemma 4 (Crypto Lemma [28]): Let G be a compact abelian group with group operation ‘+’,
and let Y = X +X1, where X and X1 are random variables over G and X1 is independent of
X and uniform over G. Then Y is independent of X and uniform over G.
Proof: Please refer to [28].
The following theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with noisy
feedback. Moreover, achievability is established through a novel encryption scheme that exploits
the modulo-additive structure of the channel and uses a private key known only to the destination.
Theorem 5: The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless modulo-additive wiretap channel
with noisy feedback is
Cfs = C, (13)
where C is the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the wiretapper.
Proof:
1. Converse.
Let
Rf = {Rf : there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)-(7) for Rf}. (14)
Also, let
R = {R : there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)-(6) for R}. (15)
DRAFT
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ignoring the wiretapper. Hence we have Cfs = supRf ≤ supR. It is clear that R is the set
of reliable transmission rate of an ordinary DMC channel with feedback. It is well known that
feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete memoryless channels, hence we have
Cfs = supR
f ≤ supR = C. (16)
2. Achievability.
For any given input probability mass function p(x), we use the following scheme.
1) Coding at the source.
The source ignores the feedback signal and uses a channel coding scheme for the ordinary
channel without wiretapper. More specifically, the source generates M = 2Rf length-n
codewords x with probability
p(x) =
n∏
i=1
p(x(i)).
When the source needs to send message w ∈ W , it sends the corresponding codeword
x(w).
2) Feedback at the destination.
The destination sets X1 = Z , and at any time i sets x1(i) = a, a ∈ {0, · · · , |Z| − 1} with
probability 1/|Z|. Hence x1 is uniformly distributed over Zn.
3) Decoding at the destination.
After receiving y, the destination sets yˆ = y − x1, here ‘−’ is understood to be a
component-wise modulo |Y| operation. It is easy to see that yˆ = x+ n1. The destination
then claims that wˆ was sent, if (yˆ,x(wˆ)) are jointly typical. For any given ǫ > 0, the
probability that wˆ 6= w goes to zero, if Rf = I(X ; Yˆ )−ǫ = I(X ; Y |X1)−ǫ and n is large
enough. The channel X → Yˆ is equivalent to the main channel without feedback. Hence
as long as Rf < C, there exists a code with sufficient code-length such that P ne ≤ ǫ for
any ǫ > 0.
4) Equivocation at the wiretapper.
The wiretapper will receive
z = x + x1 + n2, (17)
DRAFT
10
and x1 is uniformly distributed over Zn and is independent with x. Based on the crypto
lemma, for any given x, x+X1 is uniformly distributed over Zn, and hence z is uniformly
distributed over Zn for any transmitted codeword x and noise realization n2. Moreover Z
is independent with X, thus
I(X;Z) = 0. (18)
Hence we have I(W ;Z) ≤ I(X;Z) = 0, thus
1
n
H(W |Z) =
H(W )− I(W ;Z)
n
= Rf , (19)
and we achieve perfect secrecy.
This completes the proof.
The following observations are now in order.
1) Our scheme achieves I(W ;Z) = 0. This implies perfect secrecy in the strong sense of
Shannon [1] as opposed to Wyner’s notion of perfect secrecy [2], which has been pointed
out to be insufficient for certain encryption applications [3].
2) The enabling observation behind our achievability scheme is that, by judiciously exploiting
the modulo-additive structure of the channel, one can render the channel output at the
wiretapper independent from the codeword transmitted by the source. Here, the feedback
signal x1 serves as a private key and the encryption operation is carried out by the channel.
Instead of requiring both the source and destination to know a common encryption key,
we show that only the destination needs to know the encryption key, hence eliminating
the burden of secret key distribution.
3) Remarkably, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is shown to be larger than the secret
key capacity of public discussion schemes. This point will be further illustrated by the
binary symmetric channel example discussed next. This presents a marked departure from
the conventional wisdom, inspired by the data processing inequality, which suggests the
superiority of noiseless feedback. This result is due to the fact that the noiseless feedback
signal is also available to the wiretapper, while in the proposed noisy feedback scheme
neither the source nor the wiretapper knows the feedback signal perfectly. In fact, the
source in our scheme ignores the feedback signal, which is used primarily to confuse the
wiretapper.
DRAFT
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4) Our result shows that complicated feedback functions Ψ are not needed to achieve optimal
performance in this setting (i.e., a random number generator suffices). Also, the alphabet
size of the feedback signal can be set equal to the alphabet size of the wiretapper channel
and the coding scheme used by the source is the same as the one used in the absence of
the wiretapper.
C. The Binary Symmetric Channel Example
0
1
0
1
0
1
X
Y
Z
Fig. 1. The Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel.
To illustrate the idea of encryption over the channel, we consider in some details the wiretap
BSC shown in Figure 1, where X = Y = Z = {0, 1}, Pr{n1 = 1} = ǫ and Pr{n2 = 1} = δ.
The secrecy capacity of this channel without feedback is known to be [6]
Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]
+,
with H(x) = −x log x−(1−x) log(1−x). We differentiate between the following special cases.
1) ǫ = δ = 0.
In this case, both the main channel and wiretap channel are noiseless, hence
Cs = 0.
Also we have
Cps = 0,
since the wiretapper sees exactly the same as what the destination sees. Specializing
our scheme to this BSC channel, at time i, the destination randomly chooses x1(i) = 1
with probability 1/2 and sends x1(i) over the channel. This creates a virtual BSC at the
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wiretapper with δ′ = 1/2. On the other hand, since the destination knows the value of
x1(i), it can cancel it by adding x1(i) to the received signal. This converts the original
channel to an equivalent BSC with ǫ′ = 0. Hence, through our noisy feedback approach,
we obtain an equivalent wiretap BSC with parameters ǫ′ = 0, δ′ = 1/2 resulting in
Cfs = H(δ
′
)−H(ǫ
′
) = 1.
2) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2, N1 and N2 are independent.
Since δ < ǫ, we have
Cs = 0.
Also, N1 and N2 are independent, so PY Z|X = PY |XPZ|X . Then from (10), one can easily
obtain that [6]
Cps = H(ǫ+ δ − 2ǫδ)−H(ǫ).
Our feedback scheme, on the other hand, achieves
Cfs = 1−H(ǫ).
Since H(ǫ+δ−2ǫδ) ≤ 1, we have Cfs ≥ Cps with equality if and only if ǫ+δ−2ǫδ = 1/2.
3) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2 and N1(i) = N2(i) +N ′(i), where Pr{n′(i) = 1} = (ǫ− δ)/(1− 2δ).
The main channel is a degraded version of the source-wiretapper channel, X → Z → Y ,
as shown in Figure 2.
X Z Y
Fig. 2. The BSC Wiretap Channel with a Degraded Main Channel.
Hence, from (12), we have
Cs = C
p
s = 0,
while Cfs = 1−H(ǫ).
4) 0 < ǫ < δ < 1/2, and N2(i) = N1(i) +N ′(i), where Pr{n′(i) = 1} = (δ − ǫ)/(1− 2ǫ).
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X ZY
Fig. 3. The BSC wiretap Channel with a Degraded Source-Wiretapper Channel.
In this case, the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel as
shown in Figure 3; X → Y → Z, so from (11)
Cs = C
p
s = H(δ)−H(ǫ).
But
Cfs = 1−H(ǫ) ≥ C
p
s
with equality if and only if δ = 1/2.
5) N1 and N2 are correlated and the channel is not degraded.
In this case
Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]
+.
The value of Cps is unknown in this case but can be bounded by
Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]
+ ≤ Cps ≤ 1−H(ǫ) = C
f
s .
In summary, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is always larger than or equal to that of
the public discussion paradigm when the underlying wiretap channel is a BSC. More strongly,
the gain offered by the noisy feedback approach, over the public discussion paradigm, is rather
significant in many relevant special cases.
IV. EVEN HALF-DUPLEX FEEDBACK IS SUFFICIENT
It is reasonable to argue against the practicality of the full duplex assumption adopted in the
previous section. For example, in the wireless setting, nodes may not be able to transmit and
receive with the same degree of freedom due to the large difference between the power levels of
the transmit and receive chains. This motivates extending our results to the half duplex wiretap
channel where the terminals can either transmit or receive but never both at the same time. Under
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this situation, if the destination wishes to feed back at time i, it loses the opportunity to receive
the ith symbol transmitted by the source, which effectively results in an erasure (assuming that
the source is unaware of the destination decision). The proper feedback strategy must, therefore,
strike a balance between confusing the wiretapper and degrading the source-destination link. In
order to simplify the following presentation, we first focus on the wiretap BSC. The extension
to arbitrary modulo-additive channels is briefly outlined afterwards.
In the full-duplex case, at any time i, the optimal scheme is to let the destination send x1(i),
which equals 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 respectively. But in the half-duplex case, if the destination
always keeps sending, it does not have a chance to receive information from the source, and
hence, the achievable secrecy rate is zero. This problem, however, can be solved by observing
that if at time i, x1(i) = 0, the signal the wiretapper receives, i.e.,
z(i) = x1(i) + n2(i),
is the same as in the case in which the destination does not transmit. The only crucial difference
in this case is that the wiretapper does not know whether the feedback has taken place or not,
since x1(i) can be randomly generated at the destination and kept private.
The previous discussion inspires the following feedback scheme for the half-duplex channel.
The destination first fixes a faction 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 which is revealed to both the source and wiretapper.
At time i, the destination randomly generates x1(i) = 1 with probability t and x1(i) = 0 with
probability 1 − t. If x1(i) = 1, the destination sends x1(i) over the channel, which causes
an erasure at the destination and a potential error at the wiretapper. On the other hand, when
x1(i) = 0, the destination does not send a feedback signal and spends the time on receiving
from the channel. The key to this scheme is that although the source and wiretapper know t,
neither is aware of the exact timing of the event x1 = 1. The source ignores the feedback and
keeps sending information. The following result characterizes the achievable secrecy rate with
the proposed feedback scheme.
Theorem 6: For a BSC with half-duplex nodes and parameters ǫ and δ, the scheme proposed
above achieves
Rfs = max
µ,t
[
(1− t)
[
H(ǫ+ µ− 2µǫ)−H(ǫ)
]
−
[
H(δˆ + µ− 2µδˆ)−H(δˆ)
]]+
, (20)
with δˆ = δ + t− 2δt.
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Proof: For the main channel, if the destination spends a t fraction of its time on sending,
the equivalent main channel is shown in Figure 4 with output yˆ ∈ {0, φ, 1}, where φ represents
an erasure. The erasure probability is t. In the remaining 1− t fraction of the time, the channel
is a BSC with parameter ǫ. Hence, the transition matrix of this equivalent channel is

 (1− t)(1− ǫ) t (1− t)ǫ
(1− t)ǫ t (1− t)(1− ǫ)

 .
Meanwhile for the wiretapper, the equivalent channel is still a BSC, but with the increased
error probability
δˆ = (1− t)δ + t(1 − δ) = δ + t− 2δt. (21)
0
1
0
1
Fig. 4. The Equivalent Main Channel.
Hence the original BSC wiretap channel with noisy feedback is equivalent to a new wiretap
channel X → (Yˆ , Z) without feedback, and the channel parameters are given as above.
As shown in [5], for this equivalent wiretap channel the following secrecy rate is achievable
for any input distribution PX :
Rf = [I(X ; Yˆ )− I(X ;Z)]+. (22)
Hence, by using the input distribution Pr{X = 1} = µ, one can see that
Rf = max
µ,t
[
(1− t)
[
H(ǫ+ µ− 2µǫ)−H(ǫ)
]
−
[
H(δˆ + µ− 2µδˆ)−H(δˆ)
]]+ (23)
is achievable.
In general, one can obtain the optimal values of µ and t by setting the partial derivative
of Rf , with respect to µ and t to 0, and solving the corresponding equations. Unfortunately,
except for some special cases, we do not have a closed form solution for these equations at
the moment. Interestingly, using the not necessarily optimal choice of µ = t = 1/2, we obtain
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Rf = (1 − H(ǫ))/2 implying that we can achieve a nonzero secrecy rate as long as ǫ 6= 1/2
irrespective of the wiretapper channel conditions. Hence, even for half-duplex nodes, noisy
feedback from the destination allows for transmitting information securely for almost any wiretap
BSC. Finally, we compare the performance of different schemes in some special cases of the
wiretap BSC.
1) ǫ = δ = 0.
As mentioned above, here we have Cs = Cps = 0. It is easy to verify that the optimal
choice of µ and t are 1/2, and we thus have Rfs = 1/2.
2) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2 and N1(i) = N2(i) +N ′(i), where Pr{n′(i) = 1} = (ǫ− δ)/(1− 2δ).
The main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap channel, so
Cs = C
p
s = 0. (24)
But by setting µ = t = 1/2 in our half-duplex noisy feedback scheme, we obtain Rfs =
(1−H(ǫ))/2.
The extension to the general discrete modulo-additive channel is natural. The destination can
set X1 = Z , and generates x1(i) with certain distribution PX1 . At time i, if the randomly
generated x1(i) 6= 0, the destination sends a feedback signal, incurring an erasure to itself. On
the other hand, if x1(i) = 0, it does not send the feedback signal and spends the time listening to
the source. The achievable performance could be calculated based on the equivalent channels as
done in the BSC. This scheme guarantees a positive secrecy capacity as seen in the case where
PX1 is chosen to be uniformly distributed over Z . This is because a uniform distribution over
Z renders the output at the wiretapper independent from the source input, i.e., I(W ;Z) = 0,
while the destination can still spend 1/|Z| part of the time listening to the source. Finding the
optimal distribution PX1 , however, is tedious.
V. THE MODULO-Λ CHANNEL
In this section, we take a step towards extending our approach to continuous valued channels.
In particular, we consider the Modulo-Λ channel [29]–[32]. This choice is motivated by two
considerations 1) this channel still enjoys the modulo structure which proved instrumental in
deriving our results in the discrete case, and 2) the modulo-Λ channel has been shown to play an
important role in achieving the capacity of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel
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using lattice coding/decoding techniques [31] (in other words, an AWGN source-destination
channel can be well approximated by a Modulo-Λ channel). In the following, we show that,
similar to the discrete case, noisy feedback can increase the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
modulo-Λ channel to that of the main channel capacity in the absence of the wiretapper.
Before proceeding further, we need to introduce few more definitions. An m-dimensional
lattice Λ ⊂ Rm is a set of points
Λ
△
= {λ = Gu : u ∈ Zm}, (25)
where G ∈ Rm×m denotes the lattice generator matrix. A fundamental region Ω ∈ Rm of Λ is a
set such that each x ∈ Rm can be written uniquely in the form x = λ+e with λ ∈ Λ, e ∈ Ω, and
R
m = Λ + Ω. There are many different choices of the fundamental region, each with the same
volume which will be denoted as V (Λ). Given a lattice Λ, a fundamental region Ω of Λ, and a
zero-mean white Gaussian noise process with variance σ21 per dimension, the mod-Λ channel is
defined as follows [29].
Definition 7 ( [29]): The input of the mod-Λ channel consists of points X ∈ Ω; the output of
the mod-Λ channel is Y = (X+N1) mod Λ, where N1 is an m-dimensional white Gaussian
noise variable with variance σ21 per dimension. Hence Y is the unique element of Ω that is
congruent to X+N1.
In our wiretap mod-Λ channel, the output at the wiretapper (in the absence of feedback) is also
given by Z = (X+N2) mod Λ. Here N2 is an m-dimensional white Gaussian noise variable
with variance σ22 per dimension. Similar to Section II, we consider noisy feedback, where the
destination sends a feedback signal X1 ∈ Ω based on its received signal, and the received signal
at the source is Y0 = (X+X1 +N0) mod Λ, where N0 is an m-dimensional white Gaussian
noise with variance σ20 per dimension. Now, the received signal at the destination and wiretapper
are Y = (X+X1 +N1) mod Λ and Z = (X+X1 +N2) mod Λ, respectively.
For example, if m = 1, Λ = Z is a lattice in R, with [−1/2, 1/2) being one of its fundamental
regions. With this lattice and fundamental region, the output at the destination is then Y =
(X+X1+N1) mod Λ = X+X1+N1−⌊X+X1+N1+1/2⌋, where N1 is a one-dimensional
Gaussian random variable with variance σ21 . Here ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer that is smaller
than x. One can easily check that Y ∈ [1/2, 1/2). The output at the wiretapper and source can
be written in a similar manner. This m = 1 example can be viewed as the continuous counterpart
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of the discrete channels considered in Section III.
Let N′ = N1 mod Λ, and let fΛ,σ2
1
(n
′
) be the probability density function of N′ , one can
easily verify that [29]
fΛ,σ2
1
(n
′
) =
∑
b∈Λ
(2πσ21)
−m
2 exp−||n
′
+b||2/2σ2
1 ,n
′
∈ Ω. (26)
Denote the differential entropy of the noise term N′ by h(Λ, σ21). Then
h(Λ, σ21) = −
∫
Ω(Λ)
fΛ,σ2
1
(n
′
) log fΛ,σ2
1
(n
′
)dn′ . (27)
We are now ready to prove the following.
Theorem 8: The secrecy capacity of mod-Λ channel with noisy feedback is
Cfs = log(V (Λ))− h(Λ, σ
2
1). (28)
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as that of Theorem 5. For the converse, (28)
was shown to be the capacity of the mod-Λ channel with the absence of the wiretap in [29],
which naturally serves as an upper-bound for the secrecy capacity, as argued in the proof of
Theorem 5.
To achieve this secrecy capacity, the source generates length-n codewords x, with the ith
element x(i) being chosen uniformly from Ω. Hence each codeword x ∈ Ωn ⊂ Rn×m. Now,
at time i, the destination generates feedback signals x1(i) with uniform distribution over the
set Ω, and thus the feedback signal X1 is uniformly distributed over Ωn. Based on the crypto
lemma, for any codeword x and any particular noise realization n1, the length-n random variable
received at the wiretapper
Z = x+X1 + n1 mod Λ,
is uniformly distributed over Ωn and is independent with X. Hence, we have
I(X;Z) = 0. (29)
On the other hand, with X uniformly distributed over Ωn, the mutual information between X
and Y given X1 (the destination knows X1) is
1
n
I(X;Y|X1) = log(V (Λ))− h(Λ, σ
2
1). (30)
So, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a code with rate Rf = Cf − ǫ and I(M ;Z) = 0. This completes
the achievablity part.
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Our result for the modulo-Λ channel sheds some light on the more challenging scenario of
the wiretap AWGN channel with feedback. The difference between the two cases results from
the modulo restrictions imposed on the destination and wiretapper outputs. The first constraint
does not entail any loss of generality due to the optimality of the modulo-Λ approach in the
AWGN setting [31]. Relaxing the second constraint, however, poses a challenge because it
destroys the modulo structure necessary to hide the information from the wiretapper (i.e., the
crypto lemma needs the group structure). In other words, if the wiretapper is not limited by
the modulo-operation then it can gain some additional information about the source message
from its observations. Therefore, finding the secrecy capacity of the wiretap AWGN channel
remains elusive (at the moment, we can only compute achievable rates using Gaussian noise as
the feedback signal).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained the secrecy capacity (or achievable rate) for several instantia-
tions of the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, with a full duplex destination,
it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of modulo-additive channels is equal to the capacity of
the source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity
is achieved with a simple scheme in which the destination randomly chooses its feedback signal
from a certain alphabet set. Interestingly, with a slightly modified feedback scheme, we are able
to achieve a positive secrecy rate for the half duplex channel. Overall, our work has revealed a
new encryption paradigm that exploits the structure of the wiretap channel and uses a private
key known only to the destination. We have shown that this paradigm significantly outperforms
the public discussion approach for sharing private keys between the source and destination.
Our results motivate several interesting directions for future research. For example, character-
izing the secrecy capacity of arbitrary DMCs (and the AWGN channel) with feedback remains an
open problem. From an algorithmic perspective, it is also important to understand how to exploit
different channel structures (in addition to the modulo-additive one) for encryption purposes.
Finally, extending our work to multi-user channel (e.g., the relay-eavesdropper channel [26]) is
of definite interest.
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